Between Recognition and Risk: Somaliland’s High-Stakes Gamble in Embracing Israel

On December 26, 2025, Israel formally recognized the Republic of Somaliland, becoming the first country to grant official recognition to the self-declared state since it broke away from Somalia in 1991. The decision marked a dramatic shift in Somaliland’s decades-long quest for international legitimacy and immediately placed the territory at the center of a complex regional and geopolitical debate. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi signed a mutual recognition agreement that signaled intentions to cooperate in agriculture, health, technology, and trade, while echoing the logic of the Abraham Accords that reshaped Israel’s relations with parts of the Arab world after 2020 (Reuters).

For Somaliland, the moment carried historical resonance. Israel had briefly recognized Somaliland in 1960, before the former British protectorate united with Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. That recognition disappeared almost as quickly as it came, and when Somaliland reasserted its independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali state, it found itself politically isolated despite maintaining relative peace, functioning institutions, and regular elections. For more than three decades, Somaliland has operated as a de facto state without de jure recognition, building stability while remaining locked out of formal international diplomacy and finance (N7 Initiative).

Israel’s recognition now forces a reckoning. It raises fundamental questions about Somaliland’s future positioning in the Horn of Africa and beyond, and whether its leaders can convert a symbolic breakthrough into lasting gains without provoking destabilizing consequences. The answer lies not only in Israel’s intentions, but in Somaliland’s ability to navigate clashing regional interests, militant threats, and great-power rivalries.

Contacts between Somaliland and Israel did not emerge overnight. Although formal relations vanished after 1960, Israeli analysts and policymakers have periodically revisited Somaliland’s strategic relevance, particularly as instability deepened around the Red Sea. In recent years, unofficial channels and media reports pointed to growing mutual interest. Somaliland officials openly expressed willingness to engage Israel, while Israeli commentators highlighted Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden and near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints (Saxafi Media). The momentum of the Abraham Accords further normalized the idea of pragmatic engagement with Israel beyond traditional Arab-Israeli divides, and Somaliland publicly welcomed Israel’s normalization with the United Arab Emirates, signaling a foreign policy driven more by opportunity than ideology.

Geography lies at the heart of Somaliland’s appeal. Its roughly 850-kilometer coastline sits astride shipping lanes that connect Europe to Asia through the Red Sea. Any disruption in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait reverberates through global markets, and for Israel, whose trade depends heavily on secure sea routes, stability in this corridor has become a strategic imperative. The modernization of Berbera Port, backed by UAE-based DP World, has further elevated Somaliland’s profile. The port now handles growing cargo volumes and serves as a critical outlet for landlocked Ethiopia, drawing the attention of regional and global actors seeking economic and logistical leverage in the Horn of Africa

Somaliland’s internal stability adds another layer of attraction. While Somalia continues to grapple with al-Shabaab insurgency and political fragmentation, Somaliland has largely avoided large-scale militant violence. This contrast has fueled arguments in Israel and the West that Somaliland could serve as a reliable partner for maritime security, intelligence cooperation, and regional stabilization efforts.

From Israel’s perspective, recognition offers strategic depth at a moment of mounting insecurity in the Red Sea. Attacks by Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement on commercial shipping, coupled with explicit threats against Israeli-linked maritime traffic, have underscored the vulnerability of sea lanes. A friendly, stable partner near the Bab el-Mandeb potentially enhances Israel’s ability to monitor and respond to such threats, whether through intelligence sharing or joint security arrangements. For Somaliland, closer security ties promise training, resources, and international relevance in addressing maritime threats it cannot manage alone.

The economic dimension is equally compelling. Israeli expertise in agritech, water management, and innovation could help Somaliland diversify an economy long dependent on livestock exports and remittances. Expanded cooperation could draw further investment to Berbera, strengthen trade corridors with Ethiopia, and integrate Somaliland more deeply into regional supply chains, especially if Gulf partners continue to play a facilitating role. Perhaps most importantly, Israeli recognition sets a precedent. It demonstrates that Somaliland’s quest for sovereignty is not frozen in perpetuity and could encourage other states such as Ethiopia, the UAE, or even the United States to reconsider their cautious engagement if Somaliland manages the fallout effectively.

Yet the risks are substantial. Somalia has unequivocally rejected Israel’s move, framing it as a violation of Somali sovereignty. Several regional actors, including Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti, echoed this position, reaffirming their support for a “one Somalia” policy and warning against unilateral recognition of breakaway regions (Reuters). The African Union, wary of encouraging separatist movements across the continent, has historically resisted Somaliland’s case, and Israeli recognition could harden opposition among AU members while complicating Somaliland’s outreach to key partners such as China and Egypt.

Security threats may also intensify. Although Somaliland itself remains relatively calm, its association with Israel could attract unwanted attention from hostile actors. The Houthis, already engaged in confrontations with Israel and its allies, may view Somaliland as a legitimate target or pressure point in the Red Sea theater. At the same time, al-Shabaab and ISIS-linked groups operating in the region could exploit heightened regional tensions to expand recruitment or stage attacks against symbols of foreign alignment.

These dangers are amplified by the broader geopolitical contest unfolding in the Horn of Africa. The region has become a crowded arena where the United States, China, the UAE, Turkey, and Russia compete through military bases, infrastructure investments, and diplomatic influence. Somaliland’s alignment with Israel risks pulling it more visibly into these rivalries. Overcommitment to one bloc could alienate others and reduce the diplomatic flexibility Somaliland has carefully cultivated over the years. Notably, Israeli analysts themselves have cautioned against high-profile moves, recommending gradual or discreet engagement to avoid triggering backlash that could undermine both sides’ interests.

Against this backdrop, Somaliland’s future hinges less on the act of recognition itself than on how its leaders respond. Diplomatic balance will be essential. Somaliland must deepen ties with Israel without appearing captive to any single partner, while sustaining engagement with the United States, Gulf states, African institutions, and neighboring countries. Framing foreign relationships around shared security concerns and development goals, rather than symbolic politics alone, may help reduce resistance and broaden acceptance. At home, stronger institutional capacity for risk assessment and crisis management will be critical as Somaliland navigates potential retaliation, proxy pressures, or economic disruptions. Investment in maritime security and coast guard capabilities can further reinforce Somaliland’s image as a responsible stakeholder in Red Sea stability, rather than a flashpoint of conflict.

In the end, Israel’s recognition represents both a breakthrough and a test. It affirms Somaliland’s long-argued case that it is a distinct, functioning state worthy of engagement. At the same time, it exposes Somaliland to sharper regional scrutiny and higher stakes in an already volatile neighborhood. Whether this moment becomes a foundation for broader recognition or a source of new vulnerability will depend on the skill, restraint, and strategic vision of Somaliland’s diplomatic leadership as it seeks to balance opportunity against risk in one of the world’s most contested regions.